In the early hours of the morning of Wednesday 14th June 2017 a fire started in a fourth floor flat within Grenfell Tower, West London. The numbing and harrowing events that unfolded in the short time after shocked the world and perhaps led us all to question our confidence in the safety of our built environment.
The live images were broadcast as we watched in horror, agonising for those trapped and witnessing homes and lives consumed by fire.
We are all fortunate enough to live in a world where such a tragedy is considered an extraordinarily rare event due in part to world class fire safety laws. This is by no means a frivolous remark, nor a detraction from the magnitude of the Grenfell Tower disaster, as the UK is undisputedly considered as the global leader in safety, setting standards that are emulated all around the world and this is why the fire has left the experts baffled and grasping at possible answers with many theories circulating. This is a situation which is only compounding the frustration, anxiety (in some cases, anger) of those affected, directing negativity towards any authority that presents itself as a credible scapegoat. A full investigation has already started that will seek to find these answers and it may be some time before that investigation identifies the cause, so it therefore may be rash for anyone to make such accusations or assumptions based on the limited information available at this time.
This article intendeds to clear up a few myths that seem to have arisen from the media sensationalism over the last few days, and hopefully restore a little confidence back in the lives of those who either manage or live within high rise blocks.
We must remember, this is likely to have been an unlikely combination of faults, construction errors or even design negligence that has amalgamated into this catastrophe. Common questions and concerns we have received thus far:
• There were individuals reporting that they could not hear the Fire Alarm
We aren’t personally aware what type of alarm system was installed at this block (if indeed there was one installed at all), although the building would have been constructed in such a way that the fire would have been expected to be contained; so it is likely that either a communal only or zonal system (sounding alarms on surrounding floors only) was installed in order to prevent the mass evacuating of some 500 people at the precise time the fire brigade would need to be utilising the stairwell to tackle a theoretically small blaze in one flat. In fact, it is not uncommon that residents may wake the next day to hear of an incident within their block that they had completely slept through.
• There was no Sprinkler system at the block
All tower blocks newly constructed that are 30+ meters tall require sprinkler systems to be fitted as standard. Importantly, this is for new build properties only. You only find such systems retrofitted in large tower blocks where it has been identified as a necessary control measure either within the latest risk assessment or at the design stage of major refurbishment works; and even then it will only ordinarily be implemented where the risk that has instigated the control measure can be addressed in no other way (e.g. an inadequately sized fire exit route given the number of people residing at a building: rather than the impracticalities (and perhaps impossibilities) of installing a wider stairwell in a prebuilt block, the sprinkler system would then be considered a practical alternative to ensure the safety of residents.
There is no denying a sprinkler system could have saved lives in this situation, but the problem on a building of this type is the installation of sprinklers. That’s not to say it is impossible, but it is far easier to plan and build such a system into a building at the construction stage than it would be to retrofit it to an existing building. Such retro fitting difficulties would inevitably create a significant cost, and when given the tried and successfully tested theory (until now, of course) that the fire would be contained, the cost would have understandably be considered unnecessary – It is likely that the authorities may look to see whether there is a previously unidentified risk common to all existing tower blocks, or if this is indeed a terrible yet isolated situation before they jump to any changes in regulations.
• The Residents were instructed to stay put
This is incredibly likely. With a concrete construction with in excess of 60-minute fire rated partitions between flats, a mass of individuals evacuating at one time would create a problem for rescue services entering a property. The instructions they would likely have received would be to ‘Stay Put unless directly affected by smoke or flames’.
This obviously and unfortunately has not worked in this scenario, to a catastrophic end, although from the thousands of fires that have occurred in blocks of flats since this system was introduced, Grenfell and Lakanal have been among the few notable exceptions to this working in practice.
This may point towards a failing in the management of the building and, potentially, a lack of review of the buildings emergency plan at the point of refurbishment: it’s impossible to say whether such flaws in compartmentation could have been identified and addressed at the review, or even if there was a review of the plan at all, but it is certainly something that will be scrutinised as part of the investigation.
• The cladding is to blame, right?
Whilst it does look likely because of the external surface spread of flames, it would be remiss to make such a statement until the investigation has concluded. We shouldn’t be worried yet about all buildings that have been clad; any construction operation, including cladding, must be controlled by stringent CDM regulations and is then passed under the heavy scrutiny of building control before it can be officially completed – this does beg the question of whether there is a gap in the application of those controls (if indeed the cladding is to blame), but this should all come out in the wash after the thorough investigation.
Historically, flats in clad buildings have caught fire leaving little more than scorch marks on that cladding, so in our opinion, it is more likely that the installation was completed poorly or unsuitable materials were used, rather than a UK wide problem inherent to all cladding on all buildings.
As an individual responsible for managing a property, or indeed being a freeholder for a property that has been clad, you may be wondering what action you need to take: in the immediate term, get in touch with the principle contractor to get some assurance that the cladding and its installation confirms to current building and fire regulations. If the principle contractor is not available, then a chartered surveyor should be able to provide a similar service.
An essential part of Fire management is the flexibility allowed when applying the regulations and guidance. Its non-prescriptive nature and risk based approach allows those responsible to achieve its aims whatever the situation, by giving them the power to engineer their own methods to achieve the same means. This fact however, also leads to an enormous amount of differing opinions on what actually constitutes the best means of achieving the aims set out by the regulations. These differing opinions are paralleled in discrepancies between the various fire authorities (those set to police the regulations) and local government authorities, varying dramatically from County-to-County and even Borough-to-Borough.
With that in mind, there are still many unanswered questions surrounding this and many individuals in those positions of authority will most likely eventually begin providing educated assumptions based upon the early findings of the investigation: until anything is official, we must all continue to manage fire risk in property as per the current guidance and regulations by managing & servicing fire protection equipment, completing regular inspections, maintaining current risk assessments and being sure to manage the findings within them.
