What is a flat for the purposes of collective enfranchisement?

In this case the judge concluded, having seen the property, that whilst the visual appearance of flats 1 to 4 at Newbury House suggested that they were 'flats' that did not mean that on the facts of the case they would be considered flats within the definition set out in section 101 of the 1993 Act.

The leaseholder operated a booking system whereby a preference for a flat could be requested by an occupant but there was no guarantee that they would get the flat requested. The evidence demonstrated that whilst each flat had been occupied for different periods of time the general pattern of occupancy was more akin to that of a hotel rather than of someone living in the flat or using it as a dwelling.

This case is significant for emphasising the importance of not only the physical attributes of the property but also how the property is being used. A flat must be used for the purposes of a dwelling to fall within the provisions of the 1993 Act. Occupancy akin to that of a hotel or an apart hotel is not sufficient.

Paul Marco, property litigation partner at Trowers & Hamlins who acted with Leigh Shapiro on behalf of Jafton Properties Limited in their successful defence of this collective enfranchisement claim, commented:

"This judgment provides much-needed clarification for landlords facing collective enfranchisement claims.  In Hosebay, we had clarity from the Supreme Court about what constitutes a 'house', and now clarification has been provided by the County Court for flats which are subject to a claim for collective enfranchisement.

"The Court has again emphasised the importance of actual use and character of occupation, which brings common sense to this area."

Natasha Rees will be discussing the recent decision in the above case at the LEASE Annual Conference 2013. For more information visit the conference website at www.leaseconference2013.co.uk